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Abstract  
Bitcoin mining presents a significant economic incentive for efficient hashing and broadcast of 
data, both parameters stemming from the Proofs-of-Work used to advance the network. This 
incentive has led to the development of Bitcoin-specific application-specific integrated circuits 
(ASICs) and centralized mining pools, undermining the decentralized motivations behind 
Bitcoin’s design. In addition, the imminent block reward halving threatens the profitability of 
mining at any scale. Some work has been done in formal models for miner profitability, but 
existing models do not account for conditions such as the pricing of off-peak power and diverse 
investment strategies regarding sunken costs. There is also a lack of formal study of how the 
profit model changes as mining scales from the individual to the industrial level. Given the lack 
of analysis of these conditions, there are alternative models for profitable or net-zero mining 
that operate at smaller, and therefore more desirable, scale. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The intent of our work is to improve the 
health of the Bitcoin network. Some metrics 
for network health include number of miners 
on the network, number of operating pools, 
percentage of hashrate per pool, and total 
hashrate. Ideally, the network hashrate would 
comprise of many low-hashrate actors 
participating in a diverse set of pools with low 
individual percentages of the network 
hashrate. As a lower bound for 
decentralization, no one actor, miner or pool, 
should control 25% or more of the hashrate 
[1]. This distribution is dependent on the 
accessibility and profitability of mining. 
Bitcoin mining is founded on submitting 
Proof-of-Work with a difficulty that increases 
to keep the time to a solution roughly 
constant. Generating this proof is 
computationally intensive, and can be 
modelled as a conversion of electricity to heat 
[2]. In the Bitcoin case, the economic 
efficiency of proof generation is determined 
by electricity costs, hardware efficiency, and 
operational costs such as cooling. Framed in 
this way, it is clear that Bitcoin mining is most 
efficient where it is easiest to dissipate power 
or cheapest to consume it. These two 
properties are in conflict; heat dissipation is 
difficult with high densities of generation, but 
electricity pricing favors large loads. A third 
key factor is processing efficiency; as the 
hardware involved has moved past general-
purpose processors to modern ASICs, the cost 
for miners to stay competitive has increased 
rapidly. This is caused by increasing 
engineering costs for new ASICs, as well as 
growing incentives for miners to keep ASICs 
they design to themselves as a competitive 
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advantage. The development of this hardware 
and its impact on the network is clear when 
observing network hashrate over time: 
 
Figure 1. Network Hashrate over Time [3] 
 
Figure 1 depicts the network hashrate over 
time. The x axis denotes time, and the y axis 
denotes network hashrate on a logarithmic 
scale. Each vertical line in this figure marks 
the release to the public of a significantly new 
development in Bitcoin mining hardware. The 
first line marks cgminer, which allowed 
enthusiasts to mine Bitcoin using their 
graphics cards (GPUs) [4]. Prior to this 
development, mining was limited to then 
central processing unit (CPU), a processor 
type common to all computers. GPUs are a 
popular computer component, but develop 
more rapidly than CPUs and use much more 
power. GPUs perform orders of magnitude 
better than CPUs at mining because they have 
many parallel cores designed for repeated 
mathematical operations on changing data, 
making CPU mining unprofitable. The second 
mark signals the development of Bitcoin-
specific field-programmable gate arrays 
(FPGAs), which are chips that can be 
programmed to model any processor design. 
[5]. FPGAs and ASICs, which represent the last 
mark on Figure 1, provided further 
performance by implementing many parallel 
cores dedicated to only computing SHA256 
hashes, the main operation involved in Bitcoin 
mining. FPGAs and ASICs are both expensive 
dedicated hardware that most participants in 
the network would not own outside of the 
purpose of Bitcoin mining. The resulting 
hashrate increase made GPU mining 
irrelevant, again raising the threshold for 
profitable participation in mining. The 
hashrate contributed by new hardware made 
GPU miners a much smaller percentage of the 
network, and consequently greatly reduced 
the reward for these miners. The 
corresponding change in number of miners is 
shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Number of Miners over Time [6] 
 
In Figure 2, the x axis represents the network 
hashrate on a logarithmic scale, and the size 
of the circle matches the value on the x axis. 
The y axis represents the number of miners, 
which serves as a measure of centralization. A 
lower number indicates more centralization 
and vice versa. It is clear from Figure 2 that 
mining decentralization has already peaked, 
and at the moment mining is highly 
centralized with a persistent trend towards 
further centralization. The peak in this figure 
corresponds to the time period just before the 
release of FPGAs to the public.  
 
In addition to hashrate and available 
hardware, bitcoin price fluctuations play a 
significant role in determining how 
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decentralized the network hashrate will be. 
Miner rewards are denoted in bitcoin, but 
miner costs are paid in a fiat currency such as 
the U.S. Dollar or Chinese Yuan. Therefore, 
the conversion rate between bitcoin and fiat 
sets a bound for miner profitability. With an 
inflated bitcoin price, miners need not be very 
efficient, as their reward is also inflated. This 
also accelerates a difficulty increase, as more 
equipment comes online in response to larger 
profits. In the other case, a depressed price 
forces inefficient miners to take a loss, and 
only those who have enough fiat savings to 
weather a depressed conversion rate can 
sustain operations during these times. It is 
common amongst larger miners to mine at a 
loss during these times, and hold mined 
bitcoin until prices rise again. 
 
This effect, combined with the recurring 
sunken cost of new ASICs, keeps miner 
incentives tied to the Bitcoin price over long 
periods of time. Miners are subject to a 
recurring sunken cost from investing in ASIC 
developments focused on efficiency, and 
therefore further competition. There are not 
many significant ASIC developments left, as 
the processes used have caught up to the 
limits of fabrication for any processor type. 
With these trends in mind, we seek to identify 
a way to increase mining decentralization 
through operating cost reduction, which can 
lower the threshold for new participation in 
Bitcoin mining. 
 
 
 
 
2. Prior Literature 
 
Prior work has been done addressing the 
fundamental principles of Proof-of-Work, 
centralizing forces in mining, and profit 
models for Bitcoin miners. Poelstra and 
Swanson both identify electricity costs & 
physics limitations of hardware as key 
considerations with respect to the evolution 
of the network [7] [2]. Their theses are 
consistent with assumptions stated earlier 
regarding the limits of dissipating heat in 
concentrated areas, and also the conversion 
of electricity to heat by hardware.  
 
With regard to centralization risks, the Mind 
the Gap presentation by Carlsten, Kalodner, 
and Narayanan addresses the increasing time-
dependence of miner profits, and therefore 
behavior. [9] As miner revenues over time 
shift from the block reward towards 
transaction fees, mining will only be profitable 
when the sum of transaction fees for 
unconfirmed transactions on the network 
exceeds the miner threshold of cost to mine. 
This oscillating hashrate introduces major 
security risks for the network, as an attacker 
could control a percentage of the network 
hashrate much smaller than 51% if attacking 
during an unprofitable time on the network. 
The Selfish Mining attacks outlined by Ittay 
Eyal and Emin Gun Sirer also become more 
attractive under these conditions [1]. One way 
to address this risk is with miner profitability 
dependent on cycles external to the Bitcoin 
network, such as electricity prices.  
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Prior work also includes economic modeling 
of Bitcoin mining, as seen in the Minting 
Money with Megawatts presentation. [10] 
This group developed a function to define 
miner profit, seen here: 
 
Figure 4. Existing Miner Profit Function [10] 
 
The first term is a product of percentage of 
network hashrate and reward denominated in 
U.S. dollars. The second and third terms 
adjust for operating and sunken costs 
involved in mining. The function from Figure 4 
is represented graphically in Figure 5: 
Figure 5. Existing Miner Profit Model [10] 
 
Figure 5 measures hashrate on the x axis, with 
revenues on the y axis. The lower value of 
non-recurring engineering (NRE) refers to 
non-recurring cost of engineering, and the 
upper value of conversion rate multiplied by 
block reward and fee payments (B(S+F)) refers 
to the reward per block in USD. This model 
assumes a non-recurring cost of engineering, 
as well as an operational cost that scales 
linearly with hashrate. Based on the data we 
collected, we have revised this to reflect 
sunken and operational costs that are not 
linear with respect to hashrate. Our model is 
further modified by not accounting for miners 
designing their own hardware, but instead 
buying from existing ASIC vendors and making 
their first investment in mining. We also 
consider operational cost to scale non-
linearly, due to the shift from lack of overhead 
at the smallest scale to datacenter design, 
construction, and administration at the 
largest scale [11] [12] [13]. 
 
3. Definitions  
 
Bitcoin mining can be modeled as a 
conversion of electricity to heat. The cost of 
mining is dependent on energy efficiency, 
electricity pricing, cost to exhaust heat, and 
sunken costs such as new infrastructure and 
labor. Bitcoin mining can be expanded in a 
more distributed and cost-effective manner 
through widespread access to variable 
electricity pricing schemes and hardware 
setups small enough to not require additional 
infrastructure.  
 
Through analysis of historical trends of the 
mining industry and collection of data from 
current miners, we have identified three 
categories into which all present-day mining 
fits. The main distinction between categories 
is electricity consumption. We define a 
Hobbyist miner as characterized by not mining 
with any access to electricity outside of their 
living space. This constrains them to running 
hardware in their home, and thus caps the 
maximum amount of electricity they can 
consume. Homes are only wired for 
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consumption on the order of 10s of kilowatts 
(kW), and are limited to residential electricity 
prices. A Hobbyist would therefore run from 1 
to 7 units with a 10 kW limit. The only notable 
infrastructure cost is that of a smart meter, 
the utility of which is expanded upon is 
Sections 4 and 6. A 2 thousand USD smart 
meter leaves sunken costs in the range of 3 to 
9 thousand USD. 
 
The next category of miner is the Semi-
Professional; they are using a dedicated space 
for mining with specialized high-voltage 
equipment. This miner has a power envelope 
of 50 to 250 kW. This distinction is made 
because at this size, the Semi-Professional will 
not be directly connected to the grid or have 
to deal with the highest voltages used in 
modern grids. The level of infrastructure and 
design is still relatively low. A Semi-
Professional miner could run 30 to 150 units, 
and other investments such as networking 
gear and racks lead to a sunken cost of 40 to 
200 thousand USD, not including the cost of 
space used to host the equipment.  
 
The final classification of miner is the 
Professional. These miners have an electricity 
demand of 1 megawatt (MW) or more, and 
therefore would run 500 or more units. These 
miners are designing spaces for maximum 
density and cooling, and are able to connect 
directly to low-cost electricity sources such as 
hydroelectric dams [7] [14]. These operations 
also include labor as an operating cost, and 
easily cost upwards of 1 million USD not 
including space. Even within this category 
there are different styles of miner based on 
sunken cost dedicated to optimization [11].  
 
Currently, the supermajority of the current 
network hashrate is controlled by Professional 
miners [16]. This is a product of ASIC 
manufacturers becoming exclusive miners, an 
activity excluded from this model. Given the 
current state of mining, the objective is to 
reduce the return on investment (ROI) period 
for smaller actors. 
 
For the purpose of these calculations, the 
Bitmain Antminer S7 is used as the model 
ASIC [15]. This ASIC was chosen because it is 
one of few publicly available, and therefore 
accessible to miners across segments. A unit is 
defined as including an ASIC and power 
supply. The cost per unit is about 1 thousand 
USD, but varies depending on size of miner 
[15] [11] [13] [12]. With Semi-Professional 
miners, ASIC orders are discounted by about 
0.5% per unit, and Professional-sized orders of 
300+ units are discounted by 1.5%+ [15] [13]. 
The cost per MW of infrastructure ranges 
from 50 to 250 thousand USD, depending on 
the level of optimization [11]. Infrastructure 
for miners includes networking, power 
distribution, cooling, and physical layout. 
Infrastructure does not include costs to step 
down high-voltage power sources, which is 
essential if establishing a new multi-MW 
facility. That cost is on the order of 100s of 
thousands of USD per MW [12]. The cost to 
purchase facilities is also not included, but 
inherently non-existent for Hobbyist miners. 
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Given these figures for the scaling of sunken 
costs, the percentage of cost dedicated to 
non-ASIC equipment grows from 20% for the 
Hobbyist to >50% for the Professional. This 
increasing sunken cost is yet another 
argument for Hobbyist mining; the Hobbyist 
model by definition is more efficient with 
respect to hashrate per dollar invested.  
 
4. Electricity Markets 
 
Electricity markets are highly complex and 
this complexity results in major inefficiencies 
that Bitcoin miners can leverage, including 
Multi-party Supply Chains, Market Features, 
and Demand-based Pricing Schemes. 
 
There are a large number of actors involved in 
electricity generation, transmission, and 
consumption. As is seen in Figure 7, supply side 
power generators supply electricity to an 
Independent System Operator (ISO), the 
market making and price setting entity in the 
electricity market. Utilities and Energy Service 
Companies (ESCOs) purchase electricity 
capacity from ISOs and transmit it to their 
customers.  
 
 
Figure 7. Electricity market landscape [17] [18] 
 
There are two electricity markets: the Day-
Ahead Market, which accounts for 95% of 
electricity purchased, and the Real-Time 
market [17]. Prices are set on an hourly basis a 
day in advance for the Day-Ahead Market and 
in real-time on 5-minute intervals for the Real-
Time Market. Our analysis is focused on Day-
Ahead Pricing for wholesale electricity market 
prices. 
 
Customers are divided into three segments 
based on their electricity consumption: 
residential customers, commercial customers 
and industrial customers. Hobbyist miners are 
residential electricity customers and Semi-
Professional miners are industrial electricity 
customers. Actors with significant electricity 
demands can surpass dealing with utilities or 
ESCOs, form Load Serving Entities (LSEs), and 
buy directly from wholesale markets. In the 
case of New York, an LSE can only serve 
customers within the jurisdiction of the NYISO. 
An example of is the agreement between 
financial institution Fidelity and the New 
England ISO to power Fidelity’s data centers 
[18].This direct purchase model offers a saving 
opportunity for semi-professional miners in 
certain regions if they consolidate their 
electricity demand and buy electricity directly 
from ISOs and dis-intermediate Utilities and 
ESCOs. 
 
The second feature of electricity markets that 
Bitcoin miners can take advantage of is the 
spread between electricity production and 
consumption prices. As a commodity, the 
electricity price is subject to demand and 
supply.  ISOs run a uniform clearing auction to 
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set the prices in the wholesale market. In a 
Day-Ahead market, suppliers submit hourly 
production bids at certain prices (e.g. 
100MW/h for $2,000). Demand side 
stakeholders, such as utilities and ESCOs, 
submit their hourly demand forecasts and 
upper bounds for prices. ISOs set hourly prices 
for the next day based on previous demand 
and supply trends. ISOs select the lowest cost 
suppliers and continue with higher cost 
suppliers until production meets demand. The 
price at which production meets demand is 
the hourly price in the Day-Ahead Market 
[17].  
Since electricity cannot be stored in large 
quantities, the on-demand generation must 
supply system demand to avoid outages. This 
results in discrepancies between forecasted 
demand from the previous day and the actual 
demand. There also exists a real-time market 
price for electricity, decided in 5 minute 
intervals, for players wishing to purchase 
electricity at the last moment. Real-Time 
Markets work with the same economic 
principles as the Day-Ahead Market. However, 
prices in the Real-Time Market are much 
more volatile. Due to the clearing auction 
nature of price setting, the cost of generating 
energy increases in high demand periods. 
When there is extra demand (peak demand), 
suppliers operate more expensive electricity 
resources such as coal plants or gas 
combustion turbines. As seen in Figure 8, the 
real cost of serving the customer is highly 
variable and is much higher during the peak 
demand hours. The x axis displays hours of 
the day, and the y axis displays the cost per 
kilowatt-hour (kWh) during that hour. 
 
Figure 8. Electricity Costs [18] 
 
Most existing retail customers are on fixed 
price schemes, while larger customers use 
Time of Use (TOU) tariffs. Fixed price schemes 
involve an insurance premium for utilities and 
ESCOs as these players have to hedge against 
the price and demand fluctuations [18]. This 
insurance premium is passed on to the 
consumers. Figure 9 shows fixed and TOU 
price schemes offered by ConEdison for the 
analysis period for residential customers in 
New York. The x axis displays hours of the day, 
and the y axis displays the cost per kilowatt-
hour (kWh) during that hour. 
 
 
Figure 9. Daily Electricity Prices [19] 
 
Recently utilities have made an effort to 
accelerate the deployment of Smart Meters, 
which allow electricity users to access TOU 
pricing schemes. As of 2009, private and 
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public utilities in Oregon, Idaho, California, 
Arizona, Texas, Oklahoma, Florida, Alabama, 
Georgia, South Carolina, Wisconsin, Indiana, 
Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts 
and Vermont had +50% smart meter 
deployment plans. In California alone, utilities 
SCE, PG&E and SDG&E deployed 11.8mn 
smart meters. Massachusetts Green 
Community Act mandates a state-wide pilot 
and a state-wide deployment of potentially 
2.6mn smart meters [18]. The potential to 
access significantly cheaper electricity at 
certain times of the day or with certain power 
offers miners new means to reduce the 
payback period for hardware. 
 
5. Methodology 
 
The methodology used involved revised 
revenue and cost models, and applying them 
with a backwards-looking analysis using 
network data such as hashrate, price, 
transaction fees, and network difficulty. The 
analysis was performed on data from August 
1st to September 20th, 2015, and December 1st 
of 2015 to January 20th, 2015. The first period 
is characterized by a slowly-changing 
difficulty, decreasing network hashrate, and a 
price oscillating around 250 USD. The second 
period is notably different, with the network 
hashrate growing by about 66%, difficulty 
growing by 50%, and a price moving around 
400 USD. The case of price data from the first 
period during the network state of the second 
period is also considered to simulate a 
significant miner reward drop. The analysis 
uses a simple model for miner setup based on 
current publicly available hardware, as 
explained earlier. Our revised revenue 
function follows: 
 
 
 
The 
𝑋
ℎ0+𝑋
 term represents the miner’s 
percentage of the total network hashrate, and 
the product with the 𝐵(𝑆 + 𝐹) returns 
revenue in USD. The 
(ℎ0+𝑋)∗(10
9∗86400)
𝐷∗232
 term is 
used to adjust for the network difficulty and 
number of blocks generated per day. This 
value changes both with the difficultly 
readjustment every two weeks and the daily 
network hashrate fluctuation. Our revised 
cost function follows: 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟 = 𝑋 ∗ 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦  
 
This definition of operating cost fluctuates 
based on the price of electricity, which varies 
greatly based on location, time of day, and 
level of access to electricity. The primary cost 
reduction for Semi-Professional miners will be 
derived from this fluctuation, and other 
defining features of electricity markets. 
 
Electricity price data is limited to New York, 
specifically ConEdison and the NYISO. Other 
state and country electricity price data is 
considered in Section 7. 
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6. Analysis of Results 
 
Our analysis is structured to test the impact of 
the two saving opportunities we identified for 
miners in the section above. Figure 10 below 
shows average cost of mining for different 
miner segments and mining methods.  
 
 
Figure 10. Summary of Results [20] 
 
The values for each column represent average 
electricity cost in cents per kWh. The first 
saving opportunity is the ability to purchase 
electricity directly from ISOs. This brings down 
the average cost of electricity to 3.24 cents 
per kWh, which is below the “acceptable 
mining cost threshold” of 4 cents per kWh 
based on our interviews [12]. However, total 
demand required to buy directly from 
wholesale markets vary between 1MW and 
3MW based on different ISOs. Only 
Professional miners will be able to negotiate 
access to these prices, and miners experience 
difficultly obtaining access due to a lack of 
established trust between miners and 
electricity companies. Not only are miners a 
new type of high-demand electricity client, 
but there have been multiple incidents where 
irresponsible miners have significantly 
damaged the grids they were connected to 
because of poor management [14]. Within the 
first analysis period, halving electricity costs 
only resulted in a 15% increase in profit 
margin. For the second period, the increase 
was also 15%. Using price data from the first 
period on the network state of the second, 
this profit increase doubles to 31%. 
Alternatively, with a 12.5 bitcoin block reward 
at the same price as the first period, profits 
increase by 42% instead of 14%.  
 
The second saving opportunity is the use of 
data on real-time electricity prices to calculate 
expected profit on an hourly basis, and set the 
power state of mining hardware based on the 
expected profit. Real-time mining algorithms 
can calculate hourly expected revenue based 
on the hashrate of the individual miner, 
hashrate of the network, current network 
difficulty, current bitcoin prices, and hourly 
electricity costs. Currently, real time pricing 
(RTP) is possible either through RTP schemes 
offered by certain utilities such as Georgia 
Power [18]. These programs are based on 
Day-Ahead wholesale market prices and are 
set on an hourly basis. ConEdison, the major 
utility in our analysis region of New York, does 
not offer real-time pricing but instead offers 
TOU schemes. Thus the smart-mining cost 
analysis for industrial and residential 
customers are driven from TOU pricing 
scheme for respective segment.  
 
Lower average electricity costs with smart 
mining are derived from non-continuous 
mining, due to negative revenues at certain 
times of day.  Based on the ConEdison TOU 
scheme, the impact of real-time mining for 
Semi-Professional miners is about 1%. This 
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effect is not only small, but also infeasible 
given the rapid powering on and off of mining 
equipment. The larger the mine, the more 
time needed to safely power on and off the 
equipment. This 1% increase also holds for 
the second period. For Hobbyist miners, the 
impact of real-time mining is significant. Real-
time mining enables Hobbyists to access 50% 
cheaper average electricity prices and 
improve expected profits by a multiple of 7 
during the first period. Units would be 
powered on for only 59% of the day 
compared to the standard 100%. 100% duty 
cycle represents always-on mining. As 
represented in Figure 11, Hobbyists using 
smart mining can increase their expected 
profit from $137 to $929.  
 
 
Figure 11. Hobbyist Real-Time Results [21] 
 
During the second period, this multiplier 
decreases to 4.5. ASIC daily duty cycle 
increases from 59% to 61%. Most interesting 
is the case of the price data of the first period 
with the network state of the second, as real-
time mining in this case switches Hobbyist 
mining from a highly unprofitable activity to a 
profitable one. This case represents a miner 
reward halving, without a block reward 
halving.  
 
7. Discussion 
 
These results prove that there is a significant 
opportunity for increased decentralization of 
mining through operating cost optimization at 
small scales. While Semi-Professional miners 
do not benefit significantly from access to 
wholesale electricity market prices, Hobbyist 
miners can reclaim a reasonable ROI by 
accessing variable electricity prices. The 
Hobbyist savings on infrastructure and 
operating cost make this model attractive not 
just from a profit-focused perspective, but 
also considering the metrics of network 
health. The Real-Time Hobbyist model is valid 
anywhere that a resident has access to 
variable electricity prices, which applies to 
many developed nations. EU-15 countries 
such as the UK and Spain have access to 
variable pricing, and electricity is much more 
expensive in Europe compared to the US [23]. 
Excluding Hawaii and Alaska, all regions in the 
US have lower residential rates than those in 
EU-28 countries excluding Bulgaria [24]. Thus, 
the Real-Time Hobbyist model is more 
attractive to a hobbyist miner in Europe. Also, 
countries that produce electricity locally, such 
as OPEC states, provide sizable electricity 
subsidies (sub-cent/kWh) to residents and 
small businesses, allowing for profitable 
decentralized fixed-price always-on mining 
[25]. 
 
With a current average network hashrate of 
more than 1 Exahashes per second (EH/s), a 
5% participation would be 50 Petahashes per 
second (PH/s). This translates to 70 Semi-
Professional miners running about 700 
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Terahashes per second (TH/s) each, or about 
1,600 Hobbyist miners running 30 TH/s each, 
following our models of the maximum size of 
each miner type. The upfront total investment 
for this would be about $15 million USD. A 5% 
hashrate is similar in size to the current fifth-
biggest pool hashrate [16].The rough 
consensus concerning equilibrium hashrate is 
that mining activity will eventually converge 
to only the locations where it is profitable or 
investments have been paid off [7] [2]. These 
locations drop in number as the block reward 
drops, which is the supermajority (99 %+) of 
miner profits at the moment. This profitability 
and consequent centralization patterns are 
heavily affected by existing resources such as 
cheap power and inefficient electricity grids. 
What we have proven is that, for both 
historically low miner profitability, turbulent 
network conditions, and a combination of the 
two, Hobbyists can significantly lower their 
operating costs via real-time mining and 
greatly lower the threshold for profitable 
mining. 
 
Despite the positive takeaways from our 
work, there are some significant limitations to 
this model. The most significant is that we 
performed a backwards looking analysis, 
instead of a forwards looking analysis. This is 
primarily because Bitcoin as a market and 
network is very difficult to understand and 
predict the future behavior of, given how 
many external factors affect it. For this 
practical reason, we chose to use historical 
network data we knew was valid. A significant 
rise in Bitcoin prices reduces the appeal for 
cost savings as the threshold for profitable 
mining drops. 
 
Another assumption we made was that new 
miners were only concerned with real-time 
profits, i.e. were “shorting” Bitcoin and 
valuing it only with respect to its current 
price. This is contrary to the standard 
Professional miner behavior, but allows for 
better measurement of the impact of cost 
saving techniques. Those willing to mine at a 
loss could still use these techniques, but they 
are less appealing if the goal is Bitcoin-
denominated profits vs. fiat profits. We 
proved the utility of our method for the 
“short” case – The utility diminishes if the 
miner is more invested in Bitcoin and is willing 
to absorb some operating costs to hold their 
reward as Bitcoin. However, this model now 
gives the Hobbyist a choice; they can increase 
their duty cycle from the ~60% we found 
upwards to 100% at any given time to reflect 
their long-term investment in Bitcoin. 
 
6. Future Work 
 
With regards to future work, we plan to 
conduct interviews with ISOs to better 
understand the exact requirements for buying 
electricity directly from wholesale markets. 
This includes identifying the minimum 
required demand, and cost and processes 
involved in purchasing electricity directly. A 
case study focusing on energy-rich countries 
with strict capital controls such as Venezuela 
would assist in proving the social utility of the 
Real-Time Hobbyist miner model. Countries 
such as Ecuador, Paraguay, Mozambique, 
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Burma, and Vietnam are net energy exporting 
countries (+100 trillion BTU) with at least 5% 
of energy production driven from renewable 
sources, meriting future study regarding their 
energy infrastructure and the potential role 
PoW hosting could play [27]. 
 
Another worthwhile cost model to consider 
would be sunken vs. operating costs, such as 
investing in renewable energy. With access to 
variable electricity costs, a Hobbyist could 
dynamically and efficiently allocate grid-
sourced and self-sourced electricity to 
essential (appliances, lights, heating) and 
auxiliary (Bitcoin ASICs, Tor Nodes) electrical 
loads. If renewable energy networks are sized 
for peak demand, but their production 
matches day/night cycles, there may be a 
similar opportunity to absorb excess 
electricity from the grid. A similar study for 
running nodes would also be useful, as 
proving a lower operating cost could have a 
similar effect for those considering joining the 
network. The health of the Bitcoin network 
depends on many related metrics, but 
through more efficient essential resource 
usage (electricity, storage, and bandwidth), 
we can further develop the decentralization 
of Bitcoin. 
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